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PROF. SOKOL:  Let me start by thanking 
everyone here at Fordham who have put on a great 
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conference.  Let me thank the morning panelists and 
the keynotes.  I think we’ve learned a lot.  Wonderful 
presentations. 
I think in many ways when people think about 
populism and antitrust, the first thing that they 
think about, since they don’t know anything about 
antitrust or competition law, is think about their own 
personal health.  Health care is a fascinating area, 
and we’re going to get started now. 
I have wonderful practitioners and 
practitioners/academics on this panel, actually 
technically two practitioners/academics because Scott 
also spent a year here in New York. 
To my immediate right I have Fiona from 
Baker McKenzie, who has come all the way from Europe; 
I have Scott, who has come all the way from downtown; 
I have Steve, who has come from Washington, D.C.; and 
I have Reiko, who has come from Tokyo.  Combined, 
literally we span the world in terms of time zones. 
With that, we are going to start by going 
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into big-picture issues to frame the rest of the 
discussion. 
Scott, let me start with you. 
PROF. HEMPHILL:  Great.  Thanks to Danny for 
the introduction, and to James and the folks at 
Fordham for organizing what’s always a really 
outstanding conference. 
I would like to spend the next few minutes 
discussing two emerging issues that I think are of 
great importance for health care and antitrust.   
The first really isn’t a health care issue 
at first blush at all, the recent AT&T/Time Warner 
merger challenge by the DOJ.  It might seem like an 
odd place to start.  It’s not a health care merger, of 
course.  But the case has quite important implications 
for health care that I want us to think a little bit 
about. 
Second, the increasingly aggressive approach 
to monopsony — that is, to agreements and mergers that 
harm sellers through the enhanced exercise of power by 
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buyers.  This is already an important issue, and I 
think it’s going to get bigger as time goes on. 
Let me start with the AT&T/Time Warner 
merger.  As this audience knows, Time Warner owns 
Turner, a video programmer which operates several 
networks, and AT&T owns DirecTV, a major video 
distributor.  DOJ’s main argument in challenging the 
merger has been that Turner’s common ownership with 
DirecTV would lead Turner to raise its prices in its 
license negotiations with other distributors. 
This concern is based on an economic model, 
a model of bargaining pioneered by John Nash, the 
Nobel Prize winner.  In that Nash bargaining model 
upstream and downstream firms negotiate over whether 
the upstream firm’s products are included in a bundle 
of inputs offered for sale by the downstream firm.  
The model supposes that the parties bargain over the 
division of surplus from reaching an agreement 
compared to what each party would get if they failed 
to reach a deal. 
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To simplify it somewhat, the key issue in 
these models is bargaining leverage, and bargaining 
leverage affects the magnitude of the surplus the 
parties divide and derives from each party’s outside 
option — that is, their best alternative to a 
negotiated agreement (BATNA), or their walkaway value 
if the parties fail to reach a deal. 
The anticompetitive effect of a merger in 
these bargaining settings derives from the increased 
bargaining leverage.  If a party can improve its 
outside option through a merger or if it can worsen a 
counterparty’s outside option, then the party can 
increase its profits at the expense of the 
counterparty. 
As an example, imagine a negotiation over 
whether the Turner networks will be included in some 
other distributor’s offering to consumers — Dish, say.  
If the negotiations failed, there would be what’s 
called a “blackout” of Turner content on Dish. 
In response to a blackout, some customers 
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would switch to DirecTV.  That is the key move that 
drives DOJ’s argument here, which is that from 
Turner’s perspective the extra benefit to DirecTV, now 
a corporate affiliate, would soften the negative 
consequences of a blackout and thereby improve 
Turner’s outside option and enhance its bargaining 
leverage in negotiations with Dish, giving it both the 
incentive and the ability to insist on a higher price. 
You know the conclusion of this story so 
far, which is that the court rejected the conclusion 
that Turner’s bargaining leverage would actually 
increase post-merger.  The court reasoned that 
blackouts are pretty costly to Turner, very costly, 
and so a blackout would not be a credible negotiating 
threat.  The court also observed that long-term 
blackouts don’t happen that much in practice. 
Here’s where health care antitrust comes in. 
The economic theory of bargaining is also a powerful, 
commonly used tool for evaluating health care mergers.  
We see this all the time in hospital cases.  A merger 
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of competing hospitals is typically analyzed by asking 
whether the merger worsens the outside option of 
payers, and thereby increases the hospital’s 
bargaining leverage in negotiations. 
The outside option changes because if the 
insurer, the payer, fails to reach a deal, it’s now 
missing multiple hospitals from its provider network 
rather than just one.  The FTC’s successful stream of 
hospital merger challenges, going back to ProMedica, 
is premised on this theory. 
So the AT&T court’s hostility to bargaining 
theory may raise some questions about the use of this 
model in other mergers, such as mergers of hospital or 
mergers of payer. 
To be sure, the AT&T opinion is the view of 
a single district court in a particular factual 
setting, and the district court did say that it 
accepted the economic theory of bargaining.  In any 
event, the district court doesn’t have the last word 
here.  The case has been appealed to the D.C. Circuit. 
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What I want to emphasize for those of us who 
care about health care antitrust is that the D.C. 
Circuit is now in a position to make a powerful 
statement about the role of Nash bargaining in merger 
analysis, with effects on health care, and really any 
other industry where bargaining plays a major role. 
The second item I want to touch on briefly 
is the increased importance of monopsony and 
allegations that agreements or mergers enhance a 
firm’s ability to exercise such power.  By way of 
disclosure on this issue, I’ve served as an expert in 
litigation examining the alleged enhancement of 
monopsony power. 
As you all know, there has been a recent 
resurgence of interest in monopsony.  DOJ has brought 
cases alleging no-poaching/no-hiring agreements in 
other areas, such as tech workers and rail equipment 
suppliers.  These days we think of no-hire agreements 
as being subject to criminal liability. 
This is going to keep coming up in health 
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care antitrust cases.  It came up in the Anthem/Cigna 
merger challenge, which contained an allegation of 
enhanced monopsony power.  It has been raised in the 
context of FTC’s evaluation of pharmacy benefit 
manager mergers. 
There are a couple of things to keep in 
mind, a couple of developments to keep an eye on for 
the future.  
First, as the DOJ continues to bring and win 
these buy-side cases, settle favorably these buy-side 
cases outside the context of health care, I think it 
is going to become increasingly difficult for 
defendants, for example in health care mergers, to 
argue that squeezing suppliers through the reduced 
rivalry of the purchasers is a source of 
procompetitive benefit rather than itself being a 
cognizable form of anticompetitive harm. 
The second development to keep an eye on is 
the prospect of Justice Kavanaugh.  We’re in the 
middle of confirmation hearings.  As a D.C. Circuit 
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judge, Judge Kavanaugh offered a view about monopsony 
in the Anthem/Cigna merger.  For those of us who think 
of monopsony as a real problem that we need to be 
paying attention to, his views I think are half-
full/half-empty. 
On the one hand, the judge was very 
concerned about the possibility of what economists 
typically call enahnaced “classical monopsony power,”  
as a harm that we would want to pay attention to in a 
merger, and presumably in conduct cases as well. 
He was a bit more cryptic on enhanced 
bargaining power, I would say.  One reading of his 
opinion is that he’s more skeptical that antitrust has 
a role to play in those cases, a view that if it 
became broadly shared by the Supreme Court might have 
some important implications. 
PROF. SOKOL:  Scott, that was a wonderful 
overview.   
We’re going to actually move time zones.  
Reiko, I’d say the audience is least familiar with 
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developments in Japan, so I want to give you some time 
to maybe fill us all in on what does health care mean 
in a Japanese context. 
MS. AOKI:  Thank you, Danny, for inviting me 
to be part of this panel, and also Fordham for putting 
on this lovely, very instructive conference.  I also 
appreciate the opportunity to introduce you to the 
health care market in Japan very briefly. 
First of all, as many of you may know, many 
markets in Japan are shrinking because our population 
has started to shrink.  However, the health care 
sector would be one of the few that is not shrinking, 
and some markets, such as long-term care for the 
elderly, are actually expanding markets. 
First of all, everyone in Japan has publicly 
funded health insurance, and this includes long-term 
care.  Because the government is the insurer, the 
retail price in health care is basically regulated by 
the government, including pharmaceuticals. 
Growing public expenditure on health care 
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because of the increasing proportion of elderly in the 
population and the price of health care is of great 
concern to the government, which I think is common in 
many countries.  There have been public policies, 
therefore, to decrease price.  However, there is 
reluctance in Japan to rely on competition to reduce 
price based on the wrong belief that competition 
reduces quality.  Also, there is skepticism about for-
profit organizations providing health care. 
I already mentioned that pharmaceutical 
prices are regulated.  They are reviewed twice a year 
for generics and four times a year for pioneering 
drugs. 
Pioneering drug prices take into account the 
price of same or similar therapy and class, both in 
Japan and abroad, and foreign prices therefore are 
very important for determining new drug prices.  I 
thought this was very unique to Japan, but over lunch 
I was talking to Fiona, and evidently this is an 
international thing to look at the prices abroad, so 
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there is nothing special about Japan there. 
Generic drug prices in Japan are 50 percent 
of the pioneering drug at the entry.  Currently, 
generics have about 60 percent of the market, and the 
government’s goal is 80 percent by 2020, and this is 
probably achievable. 
There were about 200 generic manufacturers 
in 2007.  They all tend to be very small, about one-
tenth the capitalization of a pioneering drug company 
on the average.  So, basically, generics are very 
important to reduce price but they really don’t 
provide any competition in terms of innovation to the 
pioneering drug. 
Wholesale prices are not regulated, and 
therefore, with declining retail prices as government 
policy, the wholesale margins are declining for the 
wholesale companies.  However, they are protected by 
separate pharmaceutical supply chain guidelines issued 
by the Minister of Health, Labor, and Welfare.  That 
guideline tends to focus on protecting the small and 
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medium generic firms and also the wholesale companies.  
For those of you who know it, it has a flavor similar 
to the subcontracting law that’s in Japan for 
protecting medium and small businesses. 
Long-term care in Japan is also regulated, 
and in this case not just the output price but also 
many of the input prices.  For instance, also the wage 
of the long-term care service providers, the 
individuals.   
JFTC did a market study a few years ago 
suggesting competition in the long-term care industry 
was very limited.  For instance, long-term care market 
entry is open only to nonprofit firms, subsidies by 
local governments for long-term care are limited to 
qualified institutions, and it is not possible to 
provide funding and privately funded services together 
in a single institution.  The report suggested that a 
more procompetitive environment probably would help to 
increase both the quality and price of long-term care. 
But, as I mentioned before, the whole 
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society is very skeptical about quality in 
competition, and unfortunately this report was 
criticized by many people and in the public.  I hope 
that what I learn from this panel I can bring home and 
try to increase the quality of health care in Japan. 
Thank you. 
PROF. SOKOL:  Thank you.   
Now I want to move to the private practice 
side, two practitioners who are both eminent, both at 
global firms, who both know their jurisdiction, and, 
simply because the firms are in fact global, know just 
about every jurisdiction around the world. 
Fiona, let me start with you.  Overview 
thoughts. 
MS. CARLIN:  It just so happens that this 
year is the tenth anniversary of the EU Pharmaceutical 
Sector Inquiry, a rather traumatic experience for 
anyone who lived through it.  That sector inquiry was 
looking at a dearth of innovation coming through the 
pipeline as many blockbusters were coming off patent, 
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and fears that originators were abusing the patent 
system to stifle innovation as well as to delay 
generic market entry. 
In the last decade the tables have really 
turned on the innovation front, and that’s a topic 
that I’ll be talking about later.  Scientific 
breakthroughs over the last couple of years really 
mean that the debate today is no longer about where is 
the innovation but can society actually afford to pay 
for it. 
Innovation is to be encouraged.  It is a 
political priority of the European Commission, no 
doubt for some of the reasons that were so eloquently 
explained in the session before lunch. 
We will talk about the novel innovation 
theory of harm in the Dow/DuPont case.  That case also 
triggered a lively debate on issues like the 
commonality of shareholders in a sector and the role 
of high margins in a sector. 
High margins also feature in the enforcement 
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context.  We are just seeing the Commission’s first 
foray into excessive pricing in the pharmaceutical 
sector.  Those cases focus on generic conduct and 
really bad behavior that doesn’t pass the smell test. 
I don’t think the fact that the Commission 
has just opened an investigation into Aspen means that 
we will be seeing excessive pricing probes in the on-
patent market anytime soon, but there is a lively 
debate in Europe at the moment around pharmaceutical 
pricing generally. 
I think the uncontroversial piece in all of 
this is that competition law does have an important 
role to play in making sure that society benefits from 
the savings to be accrued from early generic entry on 
patent expiry. 
On both sides of the Atlantic I think we’re 
seeing a lot of enforcement in relation to life cycle 
management strategies alleged to have crossed the 
line, practices with highly suggestive names like 
evergreening, product hopping, sham litigation, and 
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denigration.  There is little time to get into most of 
that today, but we will be talking about patent 
settlement agreements with value transfers, and I’m 
looking forward to a very interesting debate. 
Thank you. 
PROF. SOKOL:  Thank you, Fiona.   
Steve, let me move on to you. 
MR. SUNSHINE:  Thank you, Danny.   
I am from Washington.  Some of the remarks 
that I might make today could be deemed to be critical 
of the Trump Administration, and I’m a bit concerned 
about retaliation, so I thought, instead of speaking, 
I would just write an anonymous op-ed.  You’ll see it 
tomorrow in The New York Times. 
I do think in the area of health care we 
have a bit of a repeated game problem.  Scott 
mentioned Nash bargaining.  I’ve learned everything 
that I need to know about Nash bargaining from Russell 
Crowe.  [Laughter] 
I think that in health care we have some 
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problems of a repeat game being played over and over.  
We see that in mergers.  We see that in reverse 
payments. 
We have a lot of predictability.  We know 
how the agencies are going to act in these areas.  
That’s good in some respects, in that we have 
predictability, but I’ll suggesttwo thoughts on those 
areas. 
One is that maybe we’re not getting the best 
welfare-enhancing outcome in these reviews, in the 
mergers, in reverse payments, and in other areas.  
Second, some of the challenges that we are 
facing — Fiona mentioned life cycle management, some 
of these more advanced distribution issues — these 
tools may not be all that well suited to deal with 
concerns going forward.  So we’ll talk about 
innovation, we’ll talk about competencies, and really 
what leads to long-term development. 
With that, I’d like to reserve my last 
twenty seconds, Mr. Chairman. 
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PROF. SOKOL:  Absolutely, and we’ll get to 
that in the Q&A period. 
We’ve heard hints of pay-for-delay.  
Actually, Steve, let me start by coming back to you.  
Let’s talk about pay-for-delay.  Where do we stand now 
post-Actavis?  We’re now a few years into that.  Is it 
more of the same? 
MR. SUNSHINE:  Obviously, we’ve been in the 
trenches on pay-for-delay, as you call it, for quite 
some time.  I will disclose that I was part of the 
initial Actavis case that went to the Supreme Court.1 
I think the first lesion that we should all 
learn from it is that this is largely a relic of the 
past.  As far as we can really tell from the industry, 
nobody is seriously doing these kinds of settlements 
today.  In some ways you can say that the battle has 
been won.  We’ll come back to that in a bit. 
The cases that are going on in the private 
sector, and I think there are close to eighteen now — 
                                                 
1 Fed Trade Comm’n. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013) 
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and this may sound a bit like defense counsel bias, 
and so if it does I hope you’ll pardon me in advance — 
but I think those eighteen sets of class actions are 
basically plaintiffs’ lawyers now making money off 
settlement agreements that were all done at a time 
when there was at least a legitimate argument that 
these settlements were per se lawful if they were 
within the scope of the patent. 
There has been a lot of litigation back and 
forth over all these settlements.  Almost all of them 
are settlements that occurred before the Actavis case 
was decided, and in fact I think almost all of them 
were before the circuit split with the K-Dur opinion 
in the Third Circuit.  So, just to get that out as 
framework, we’re all fighting about the past on things 
that aren’t happening anymore. 
The Actavis decision as a decision is 
amazingly successful in being completely ambiguous and 
meaning to the reader whatever the reader wants to 
behold.  There are issues that are being debated still 
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to this day, with district courts coming out in 
different places on a number of issues:  
(1) Is it a rule of reason case or not?  If 
you can show that a settlement is a penny over avoided 
litigation cost, do you have an irrebuttable 
presumption that the settlement must be adverse to 
competition? 
(2) Do patent merits actually matter?  We 
have some cases saying that patent merits don’t matter 
at all and some cases saying that you can infer by the 
size of the payment whether patent merits are 
relevant.  You have other cases that say it’s actually 
an antitrust causation issue if the plaintiff can’t 
show that the defendant was going to bring the product 
to market.  These are still open issues.   
(3) There is an open issue about market 
definition: Do you need to define a relevant market?  
What is the relevant market?  Is it the listed product 
and an AB equivalent, or can you look at other 
products that become involved?  There are cases that 
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are going different ways on this direction. 
The FTC is still fighting three of these 
cases.  They’re fighting the AndroGel case, the AbbVie 
case, and the Lidoderm case, so these cases are still 
being litigated by the FTC, although there really 
isn’t anything at stake in those cases per se other 
than a clarification of the law.  Those markets have 
cleared and have had generic entry. 
What I worry about from reverse payments 
going forward is Actavis was pretty clever in the way 
that it tried to incorporate all of prior law in the 
patent area and in the antitrust area, and Actavis 
came to the conclusion that what had been a tension 
between a patent’s innate right to exclude — obviously 
that’s what a patent is — and antitrust principles, 
that those two principles should be balanced. 
In the Actavis decision there was an express 
judgment that the policy of antitrust overcame some of 
the rights of the patent holders.  That is a pretty 
novel concept.  That can be applied a lot of places 
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outside of the very narrow Hatch-Waxman context. 
Courts have been slow to do that.  It has 
been argued in a few places.  We will talk about some 
of the other areas now where this highly activated 
plaintiff’s antitrust bar, and the agencies for that 
matter, are looking to provide some basis to say, 
“Let’s get in and start picking winners and losers.  
Let’s get in and start regulating innovation.  Let’s 
get in and see if we can after the fact decide that, 
‘Gee, there should have been a better outcome.’” 
I think this is a very dangerous area going 
forward.  Once we get out of the Hatch-Waxman context, 
the tools that the plaintiffs were relying on — 
mandatory state substitution, exact equivalence of 
products because that’s what the Food and Drug 
Administration requires — those are gone.  Then we’ll 
be back to our basic antitrust tools that we’ve been 
talking about. 
I would like to go to the more general 
question: Is the world a better place now that we have 
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this rule about reverse payment settlements?  A 
branded company making a settlement with a generic 
should negotiate that settlement only on the basis of 
entry date and avoided-litigation costs. 
As I said, virtually all settlements have 
gone in that direction.  That’s how they’re now 
settling cases.  There are very few, if any, reverse 
payments.  Is the world a better place?  I think that 
question is still out for debate. 
A client who I do a fair amount of work for, 
Teva, the world’s largest generic manufacturer, 
challenges patents as part of its business.  They have 
an entire budget for developing abbreviated new drug 
applications (ANDAs).  They have a litigation budget, 
and they have a portfolio of cases that they have to 
manage within that budget. 
The question is: At the end of the day are 
we shaving more years off patents and getting earlier 
entry under the system we have today than under the 
old system where settlements could be helped along by 
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some kind of other payment or consideration?  I’m not 
saying that the answer to that question is 
unambiguously “Yes, we would,” but I’ve seen enough to 
say: “Hm, that’s a good question.” 
Look at Teva.  Its financial problems have 
been all over the financial press.  It is constricting 
their litigation budgets.  It is in a much tougher 
place.  It can’t afford to litigate these cases.  A 
simple case can cost $15 million.  Is that a better 
outcome, to force them to litigate? 
Branded companies have historically been 
extremely risk-averse and happy to settle.  If you 
make them litigate more cases to conclusion, are they 
going to win more, and no years will be shaved off the 
patent? 
I think it’s very easy to focus after the 
fact of a settlement and say, “Oh gosh, look at this 
generic company out there trying to act for the 
benefit of consumers.”  It is a private company that 
invested its money, and to now say, “We think we can 
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get a better outcome in this case after the fact,” I 
think is a topic that is worth further study. 
I will stop. 
PROF. SOKOL:  Thank you.  That was great.  
I used the non-neutral term pay-for-delay, 
which you corrected me very nicely by calling it a 
reverse payment.  We’ll call it reverse payment from 
now because, regardless of what you read elsewhere in 
the newspaper about what’s happening in the United 
States, here at least we’re going to be civil. 
Fiona, why don’t you offer us a European 
perspective because reverse payments have also been 
quite fascinating.  You’ve been also involved in these 
issues. 
MS. CARLIN:  In Europe we have two decisions 
from the European Commission, both of which are under 
appeal to the European courts, and a third case which 
has recently been referred from the UK Competition 
Appeals Tribunal for a preliminary ruling to the 
European Court of Justice. 
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I would describe the situation in Europe as 
messy.   
In the first Lundbeck decision of 2013, I 
think the Commission shortcuts the analysis by 
condemning reverse payment settlements as a 
restriction of competition by object, to all intents 
and purposes a per se infringement.  They achieved 
that, I think, through a sleight of hand by 
determining quite quickly that the originator and the 
generics entering the market at risk during the period 
of patent exclusivity were potential competitors.  It 
follows from that conclusion that any agreement to 
delay generic market entry can be equated with a 
hardcore cartel.  With this, the burden of proof is 
reversed, and the cards are firmly stacked. 
The Lundbeck decision at the time was quite 
surprising.  The facts around the settlement had been 
on the radar of the competition authorities for years.  
The 2004 Technology Transfer Block Exemption 
Guidelines that were in place at the time stated quite 
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clearly that “parties to a valid dispute that find 
themselves in a one-way or two-way blocking position 
cannot be considered as competitors.” 
If you take that logic to the next step, it 
would follow that, as long as there has been no fraud 
in obtaining the patent and as long as the patent 
dispute is a genuine dispute, the parties should be 
free to settle without risking the cartel-style 
prosecution of a by-object restriction. 
In the subsequent decision one year later in 
Servier, the Commission hedged its bets.  It 
determined that the patent settlements in that case 
were a restriction of competition by object, but also 
by effect, and for good measure they threw in that it 
was an abuse of a dominant position. 
In the short time available I’m going to 
briefly outline the main issues at the risk of 
oversimplifying.   
First, just a comment on the notion of 
potential competitors.  I am going to quote the 
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Lundbeck judgment of the General Court, which I think 
regrettably is one of the worst judgments I’ve ever 
read coming out of Luxembourg.  The court in that case 
said: “Patents are presumed valid until they are 
expressly revoked or invalidated by a competent patent 
authority or court.”  So far, so good. 
But then the circular reasoning comes in and 
the court says: “This presumption of patent validity 
cannot be equated with a presumption of illegality of 
the generic products validly placed on the market 
which the patent holder deems to be infringing.”  I 
don’t know what to say to that logic.  I think generic 
entry at risk cannot be considered lawful until proven 
to be infringing without fundamentally undermining the 
patent system.  
The General Court then compounded the 
problem in ruling that the patent holder cannot rely 
on a subsequent ruling from a patent office upholding 
the patent’s validity to escape the finding that the 
generic at the time the agreement was signed was a 
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potential competitor. 
The Commission in the Lundbeck case 
recognizes that settlements without financial 
inducement are usually outside the scope of the 
competition rules altogether.  It would seem then that 
it’s the value transfer, it’s the monetary value 
that’s transferring, that is sufficient to tip an 
agreement outside the competition rules into a 
hardcore cartel-type territory, and it’s not at all 
clear why that’s the case. 
Settlements within the scope of the patent 
are limited to potentially infringing products.  
Generics are free to enter with a noninfringing 
product.  I don’t think that that situation meets the 
standard of revealing a sufficient degree of harm to 
competition to trigger a per se classification. 
Post-Lundbeck but before the General Court’s 
ruling in that case, the European Court of Justice 
delivered a landmark ruling in the Cartes Bancaires 
case.  That case ruled that the by-object 
 32 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
classification requires a proper analysis of the 
agreement, its objectives, the economic and legal 
context, including a close look at the nature of the 
goods affected and the real conditions of the 
functioning and structure of the market in question. 
The Lundbeck General Court pays lip service 
to Cartes Bancaires but concludes that the citation 
I’ve just mentioned does not concern the specific 
category of an agreement in a particular sector, and 
it is apparent from the broad logic of the 
Commission’s decision that the Commission applied the 
concept by-object in the economic and legal context.  
In short, the General Court essentially disregarded 
the Cartes Bancaires standards. 
Another comment: Payments often reflect the 
genuine legal uncertainty around the outcome of a 
patent dispute, the patchy or nonavailability of 
injunctive relief, and the asymmetric risk that the 
parties are taking.  The generic has very little to 
lose, but the originator stands to suffer irreparable 
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harm because once an unlawful generic comes on the 
market, the price falls, it never goes back up again, 
and there are pricing repercussions in other markets 
as a result of international reference pricing.  The 
Commission and the General Court recognized this 
irreparable harm but concluded that it is a “normal 
commercial risk.”  In Europe we don’t have the Hatch-
Waxman clearing-the-way-type mechanism. 
I think the General Court in Lundbeck 
ignored Cartes Bancaires and ignored the legal and 
commercial reality. 
In the Servier decision, the Commission 
repeats the same errors in the by-object analysis.  In 
the by-effect analysis it compounds the problem by 
cross-referring to the by-object analysis.  So if the 
elimination of potential competition is the 
counterfactual in the by-effect analysis, the rest is 
a foregone conclusion. 
I’m not going to get into the market 
definition and the dominance issues, but all of those 
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issues are now pending before the Court of Justice in 
the reference from the UK Competition Appeals Tribunal 
that was made in March.  The fact that that reference 
has been made just confirms that Lundbeck is not fit 
for purpose. 
To conclude, I think the challenge is to 
craft a by-effect standard for these types of 
agreements that allows us to distinguish a patent 
settlement that is a blatant cartel from a patent 
settlement that is a perfectly reasonable way of 
resolving the uncertainties of patent litigation 
without getting into an assessment of the validity or 
value of the patents in dispute. 
I’ll stop there. 
PROF. SOKOL:  Thank you.   
Apparently there is a lot of clarity in law 
and policy both in the States and in Europe is how I 
would summarize our discussion up until now. 
Reiko, I’m sure Japan is just as clear in 
terms of what’s going on, yes? 
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MS. AOKI:  Actually, it is. 
PROF. SOKOL:  Okay.  That’s worth writing 
for Global Competition Review (GCR) and MLex and 
anyone else who’s here.  I just want to make sure.  
Okay, go ahead. 
MS. AOKI:  I’ll first explain to you how it 
works in Japan.   
In Japan regarding generics there is a 
policy called “patent linkage for generic drugs.”  
This says that the Pharmaceuticals and Medical Device 
Agency (PMDA) will approve a generic only after the 
substance patent and the pharmaceutical patent, the 
efficacy patent, have expired, and this is exactly to 
avoid infringement disputes. 
But the outcome of this rule is that it is 
basically the same as reverse payments in that it 
delays entry, so the consumers are just the same as in 
the world of reverse payments.  The only difference is 
how the surplus is split between the pioneering drug 
manufacturer and the generic manufacturer.  In Japan 
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there is no payment from the pioneering drug to the 
generic manufacturer.  The pioneering drug keeps all 
the surplus from the prolonged monopoly. 
It goes back to the question that Steve 
posed: Is the world better off with reverse payments?  
You can have a very clear system, like Japan, but 
there is still much to be warranted in terms of trying 
to increase the consumer surplus. 
The JFTC did a study about generic drugs and 
innovation.  I won’t go into the details, but partly 
due to this rule that they have there, the generic 
manufacturers really don’t pose any threat to the 
pioneering drug manufacturers in terms of innovation.  
They showed empirically the variable that seemed to 
affect the R&D expenditure of pioneering drugs is 
actually competition abroad; if they have large sales 
abroad, then their R&D is large.  But the existence of 
generic drug manufacturers or how many generic drugs 
have entered the market doesn’t seem to affect the 
innovativeness of the pioneering drug. 
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I’ll stop there. 
PROF. SOKOL:  Thank you.   
We’re going to now move from reverse 
payments to something else that I think is very 
exciting for people, mergers.  Once again, I’m going 
to start with Steve, who still has twenty seconds left 
that I haven’t forgotten about.  Reiko has some time 
left, too; I’ll give that back to her.  James will 
tell me when we’re really going to stop based on any 
number of things, but we’re not there yet.   
Steve. 
MR. SUNSHINE:  Thank you.   
Mergers is a topic near and dear to my 
heart.  I think in the area of mergers health care is 
pretty fascinating for a number of reasons. 
Let me start first with pharma.  In the 
United States it’s almost unique — perhaps it is 
unique.  We have to do a comprehensive survey, but we 
also know the future in the pharmaceutical world. 
Why do we know that?  Because the FDA 
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pipeline is so gosh-darned long.  We know for a 
product that, once it gets out of research and into 
the clinic, we have five or six years to see.  Usually 
antitrust enforcers would look and say two years is a 
pretty good framework.  The Merger Guidelines seem to 
favor that approach, obviously longer in places. 
We know all about potential competition.  We 
arguably know all about innovation.  So we have this 
great crystal ball. 
The FTC reviews pharma mergers in the United 
States.  The FTC acknowledges, “Well, of course 
projects in development fail,” but the FTC’s position 
— and I don’t think it’s incorrect — is: “As long as 
the project has some reasonable probability of coming 
to success we want to preserve it, and so we want to 
continue to treat it as a separate asset.”  Whether 
you call it a potential competition theory or an 
innovation theory, we have this crystal ball that 
allows us to look into the future. 
However, we have a second problem in the 
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pharmaceutical area:it’s one of the most inelastic 
markets out there.  There are certainly examples where 
drugs compete with one another — I’m not saying that 
they’re not — but there are so many instances with our 
system, with multiple payers, with the physicians 
having tremendous input, where a decision is really 
not made on the basis of price.  That leads to 
extremely narrow markets. 
We have some precedents that say the market 
has to be the same molecule, it has to be the same 
mechanism of action, it has to be the same indication, 
but we’re left with this very narrow look at what 
markets are. 
That means that if two pharmaceutical 
companies are going to merge, it’s actually pretty 
easy to go through and say: “You are going to have 
problems here, here, here, and here.  But not to 
worry.  These are pretty narrow products.  We’ll just 
divest the smaller of the two.  We’ll get our $20, 
$30, $40 billion merger though, and we’ll have to sell 
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a dozen products or whatever.  Life goes on.”  From a 
merging company’s perspective that’s great. 
There are questions.  Are we missing the 
bigger picture?  Are there areas where companies have 
unique competencies that really can’t bring those 
products to market?  As a random example, say that 
there are only three or four companies that can really 
make vaccines.  Should we think about vaccines in some 
broader area of competency? 
The problem in most of health care is that a 
lot of the big companies now are actually exiting out 
of early-stage research, and that’s being done more 
and more in universities and small startups and in 
other kinds of areas.  So you don’t necessarily have a 
match of all the assets that you would look for in a 
true innovation market. 
If I think back to some of the innovation 
market work that the DOJ was doing in the mid-1990s, 
they were looking at identifying sources of innovation 
and trying to find areas where there were very limited 
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sources of innovation.  In early pharmaceutical 
development maybe there are a lot of sources of 
innovation out there, so you want to look in these 
areas at where there are sets of competencies where if 
you don’t have that set of competencies, you can’t 
bring those products to market. 
In the area of oncology and big molecules, 
it is very difficult to understand how two molecules 
are actually going to act inside of a patient.  That’s 
why to this day we don’t have generic biologicals, 
because how you cook the molecule actually matters.  
These are enormous molecules compared to the 
traditional ones, and it’s not just what they are 
constituted of, but it’s actually their structure and 
their polarity, and they may act completely 
differently inside the body.  If you do that, you 
almost get to the area of saying each molecule is its 
own market, and we know where that leads us. 
One area in pharma now that is becoming more 
and more of an issue is the question of collaborations 
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and combination products because these large molecules 
treating things like antivirals or oncology discovered 
that putting some of these products together is the 
way to get the best patient outcomes.  So if Large 
Pharma Company A is developing molecule A and Large 
Pharma Company B is developing molecule B, they don’t 
compete, but together they form a very good 
combination drug that really knocks out the disease. 
Is it a good thing that they merge?  What 
about Companies C, D, and E out there that may have 
one of those two complements that is arguably a better 
product — or a worse product — that are now being 
denied access?  So we are going back to all of those 
vertical theories that we have talked about before in 
an area where it is very difficult to predict the 
future. 
I agree with Scott that the AT&T/Time Warner 
decision is not going to provide any precedent going 
forward.  I do think, in fairness to the case and to 
DOJ and to Dr. Shapiro, who testified for the DOJ, the 
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bargaining model was completely accepted by the court.  
The problem was that the results of the bargaining 
model were a very small anticompetitive effect, and 
there was a lot of evidence in dispute about: (1) the 
dynamics of the market that might overcome it; and (2) 
the efficiencies. 
I think what the court did was a very 
careful balancing of reams and reams of evidence.  If 
I was to criticize DOJ, it was almost too much 
reliance on Dr. Shapiro and not enough on other kinds 
of evidence that would support that overall 
conclusion.  As a result, in AT&T/Time Warner what we 
got was one case where there was no really new law 
developed and there was a failure of proof without a 
rejection of the bargaining model as a theory. 
If I use my additional one minute and twenty 
seconds and I translate that into the health care 
area, I think we are going to have the same proof 
problems in some of these areas in oncology where 
these products often are not even in patients yet, or 
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they are in early-stage studies where maybe fourteen 
patients have been treated.  Therefore, understanding 
what the effects of these mergers are going to be in 
these very early-stage markets will be extremely 
difficult. 
I worry about the other side of innovation, 
which is getting companies to invest in these 
enormously expensive projects. 
Let me stop there. 
PROF. SOKOL:  Thank you.  That’s really a 
spectacular overview. 
I’m going to mix things up.  Instead of 
going to Fiona next, I’m going to go to Reiko next.  
That way it stays exciting. 
MS. AOKI:  I am going to say something 
different from what I’ve prepared.  I was going to 
briefly go over the mergers in Japan, but I don’t 
think there is anything special about them. 
The one thing I do know is that in Japan 
only firms are required to report mergers in advance 
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and be examined for questionable mergers.  But in 
Japan, as I said, for-profits are under suspect, so 
all hospitals in Japan are called “medical service 
agencies.”  For that reason, hospital mergers are 
never examined in Japan.  That’s something that is 
unique to Japan. 
I would just like to go back to the first 
comment that Steve made about how narrow the 
pharmaceutical market was.  Pharmaceuticals are only a 
part of a broad spectrum of different methods of 
addressing an ailment, and actually there are choices 
other than just giving drugs to a patient to fix the 
ailment. 
Should the market be defined perhaps even 
larger — to fix a particular disease you can use this 
drug or do this exercise or eat this or that — and 
shouldn’t that be the whole market?  In that case, 
perhaps drugs are costing too much compared to the 
alternatives.   
This vast investment that you mention that 
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has to be recovered maybe socially is an unnecessary 
investment when you just concentrate on fixing the 
particular disease.  It’s just a comment, and that’s 
all I wanted to say.   
Thank you. 
PROF. SOKOL:  Great, thank you.   
Fiona? 
MS. CARLIN:  There is a bit of a cottage 
industry opening up in Europe at the moment looking at 
consolidation and innovation in the pharmaceutical 
sector.   
The trend started in 2016 with two 
economists from the Düsseldorf Economics Institute 
publishing a paper where they said they looked at 
sixty-five pharma mergers and found that every single 
one of them reduced competition and innovation between 
the merging parties.  They went further and noted that 
average patenting and R&D expenditure fell across the 
relevant sector, not just between the merging parties, 
by more than 20 percent within four years of any deal. 
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The European Commission has a tender out for 
a study on the impact of more than one hundred pharma 
mergers between 2010 and 2013.  I think we can expect 
a lot of debate going forward on these studies and 
what conclusions can safely be drawn from them. 
I just wanted to point out very quickly the 
new German and Austrian deal value thresholds that 
have recently entered into force.  I am not going to 
get into the details, but just flag them for people 
who may not be aware that they catch not only the 
acquisition of biotech startups potentially but also 
the acquisition of IP portfolios and even, if I’ve 
understood correctly, exclusive IP licenses.  That’s 
just something to be aware of. 
Those types of laws are likely to be copied 
elsewhere.  I think the Koreans are already 
legislating similarly.  I think you might ask the 
question whether it’s using a sledgehammer to crush a 
nut, whether it’s a proportionate response to a 
perceived gap in the current rules.  But it certainly 
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doesn’t make life any simpler in relation to companies 
seeking to do transactions. 
I want to spend the majority of my time on 
the innovation theory of harm in Dow/DuPont.  I think 
it’s an astonishing case in many ways. 
The Commission will say I’m exaggerating, 
that “Dow/DuPont was very fact-specific, there were 
lots of bad internal documents showing plans to 
drastically cut R&D expenditure, and that the economic 
theories developed in the decision are really just 
there to lend a bit of rigor to the legal analysis, 
and that no early economic model was actually applied 
in the case — so, Fiona, don’t worry.”   
I take some reassurance from that response 
from the Commission, but I do think it is important to 
have a proper debate about the issues raised.  Just a 
couple of points.  
The decision in Dow/DuPont relies very 
heavily on the economic literature to establish a 
presumption of harm in concentrated sectors with high 
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entry barriers, high contestability, high 
appropriability, and a high degree of cannibalization 
between the products of the merging party. 
To me that describes most innovative 
sectors, not just crop science, but pharma, industrial 
engineering, tech, and chemicals.  So broad 
application, and that’s why I think this needs a 
debate. 
Second, the case goes far beyond the 
conventional approach, looking at overlaps in product 
and product pipelines, and goes right back to the 
research direction of travel at the basic R level in 
the R&D.  So the question is not whether the companies 
merging have competing molecules in development but 
whether they are researching a solution to the same 
problem.   
The notion of innovation spaces comes in.  
They are not markets, but apparently that does not 
prevent the Commission from assessing the impact of 
the merger on the level of innovation efforts not only 
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between the merging parties but also across the 
sector. 
My favorite paragraph of the decision is 
Paragraph 3053.  I’m going to quote it if I may: 
“Although the Commission cannot identify precisely 
which early pipeline product or research the parties 
would discontinue or defer or redirect, and thus which 
innovation spaces would be harmed, the Commission 
nonetheless considers that the reduction in innovation 
effort by the parties would affect a large number of 
innovation spaces.” 
I think that is problematic because, with 
this presumption of harm in an undefined innovation 
space that doesn’t constitute a market, the burden of 
proof switches to the parties to come up with 
quantifiable, verifiable efficiencies arguments to 
offset that presumption, and that simply cannot be 
done. 
The decision also is quite interesting in 
that it assumes harm in the overall sector in which 
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the merger is taking place and for good measure a lot 
of other stuff is thrown in there.  The Commission 
notes that past consolidation in the crop science 
sector meant that the Big Five had reduced their R&D 
spend as a percentage of revenue by 1.7 percent over 
the last eight years; output had decreased but 
profitability had increased; R&D spend in Europe 
fifteen years ago used to be 33 percent of the total — 
that was down to 10 percent by 2010.  Common 
institutional investors holding minority shareholdings 
across competitors was also flagged as a problem.  So 
a lot of stuff in there, none of which was apparently 
relevant to the ultimate outcome of the case. 
The debate is not going away, and I don’t 
think it’s limited to the specifics of Dow/DuPont.  
The Commission’s Chief Economist last summer 
came out with two papers further developing the model, 
and this summer some leading independent academics 
from some of the leading universities in Europe 
critiqued the Commission’s economist’s work and have 
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concluded that presumptions are immature and that more 
economic work, including empirical work, needs to get 
done to develop a proper theoretical framework for any 
basis of an innovation theory of harm in merger 
control. 
They point out some of the features that the 
initial modeling of the Commission did not consider, 
and if Danny will give me two minutes, I’ll tell you 
what they are. 
PROF. SOKOL:  Yes. 
MS. CARLIN:  Just one or two examples.   
The first is that there is a possibility 
that a merger actually incentivizes innovation where 
the merging parties seek higher profits through 
product differentiation as a way of avoiding 
cannibalization.  That’s one new element. 
Streamlining R&D efforts within the merged 
entity can actually help parties be better placed to 
win an R&D race in certain circumstances.  R&D 
insights shared between the merging parties may be 
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nonrival and applicable over a broader range of 
products and encourage demand, expanding innovation 
and not just increased profits. 
Those are some of the additional factors 
that the academics conclude should not be considered 
second-order effects and relegated to an efficiencies 
defense.  It is really important that they are brought 
into the front end of the analysis. 
I think the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development Secretariat’s paper that was 
published around the June 2018 meeting on this topic 
does suggest that efficiencies arguments should be 
considered at the same time as innovation harm and 
there should be a neutral presumptive approach.  It 
would be really helpful if the European Commission 
would endorse that that is indeed the correct 
conceptual framework. 
In short, while economists debate these 
interesting theories, in practice companies 
contemplating a merger, especially in regulated 
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sectors with high margins and strong patent 
protection, should expect ever-closer scrutiny. 
Just a note by way of an anecdotal bit of 
fun at the end.  In clearing the Bio/Monsanto deal, 
the European Commission’s press release proudly noted 
that the Commission had reviewed 2.7 million internal 
documents.  That’s problematic, but also problematic 
are these theories that have simplistic presumptions 
and that put the burden on the merging parties. 
It is worrying because in Europe effectively 
there is no judicial review of merger control.  I 
think, therefore, it is incumbent on the Commission to 
take a very disciplined approach when it comes up with 
these types of theories. 
I am not saying that innovation is not a 
genuine area for exploration, but, because of the lack 
of effective judicial review, I think real discipline 
and much further study needs to be done. 
Thank you. 
PROF. SOKOL:  Thank you.   
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Fiona started us off by talking about a 
study from the economist of Dynamic Integrated 
Climate-Economy (DICE).  I think we can suggest that 
her comment — intervention essentially — is DICE/no-
DICE.  [Laughter] 
I want to continue with that metaphor with 
Scott, who starts at no-DICE and moves to DICE.  Let 
me explain.  For the first six years of Scott’s career 
I would say the R&D was primarily in reverse payments, 
a series of papers.  This gets adopted in terms of the 
framework of the FTC in many of their cases that they 
keep on losing — no DICE. 
Then, all of a sudden, something happens.  
It turns out Scott may have been right, where the FTC 
starts winning, and then we see ultimately victory in 
Actavis, and now we’re in the world of DICE. 
Steve told us that there is lack of clarity. 
But it turns out that, DICE or no-DICE, Scott probably 
has some thoughts on how things have developed. 
Scott. 
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PROF. HEMPHILL:  A couple of thoughts.  
First, I’m happy to use the term “reverse 
payments” to satisfy Danny and it sounds like others 
on the panel.  I think it’s fair to say, though, that 
in cases where it is in fact so that the brand pays 
the generic hundreds of millions of dollars to stay 
out of the market until patent exploration, and if we 
all agree that those are the facts, let’s imagine that 
is reasonably accurately described as paying for 
delay.  At least in those circumstances we could agree 
that that would be an okay label. 
I was struck, Steve, by your comment that, 
if I caught it right, that generics like Teva are 
highly risk-averse.  That may well be right. 
MR. SUNSHINE:  Brands, I said. 
PROF. HEMPHILL:  I thought you were talking 
about generics as well?  No, just brands.  Okay.  
You’re on brand then.  Most commonly plaintiffs are 
arguing that generics are on the risk-averse side. 
I’m struck by Steve’s comment wondering 
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whether we’re in a better place after all of this 
fighting.  I think there are a few good reasons to 
think yes. 
One, there is just a straight prediction of 
economic theory, which I think is pretty robust, that 
if payment is permitted, that brands will have an 
incentive to pay, pay, pay, pay for the generic to 
stay out until patent exploration.  When you recognize 
that often these cases involve multiple patents with 
overlapping entry dates, where the equilibrium leads 
is it could be a date that’s pretty far out. 
This isn’t just economic theory.  In some of 
these case — not all of these cases — we have pretty 
good documentary evidence.  I’ve been involved with 
some of these cases that what the parties really 
understood was that they were either taking a payment 
or making a payment in order to induce or accept a 
pretty extensive delay. 
Finally, I think there is a certain “proof 
is in the pudding.”  I have two ideas here.   
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One, we no longer, I think, see some of the 
very extreme settlements that we once upon a time saw.  
By way of disclosure, I worked as a plaintiff’s expert 
in one of these very old cases from the 1990s, Cipro, 
which involved the hundreds-of-millions-of-dollars 
payment that I have in mind.  I am not aware of any 
post-Actavis — or for that matter post-K-Dur — 
settlements where a brand would pay a generic nearly 
$400 million to stay out until the expiration of the 
last patent, more or less. 
That could be regarded as a benefit aside 
from the markers that we’re laying down for what the 
rules of the road look like in the future. 
This is for me a very provocative question, 
are we better off?  I think there is a source for 
doubt — although I’m not sure it’s Steve’s source — 
which is you can do a lot of work — or harm or damage, 
depending on how you look at it — without using an 
observable payment.  This tracks a little bit the 
defense to cartel cases that goes, “Well, 
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interdependence is really easy in this market, and so 
therefore we could achieve elevation without the 
communications that you caught us making.”  Are things 
that much worse in the cartel world than they would be 
in the but-for world? 
Here I think it is the case that a generic, 
even if limited to the instrument of selecting an 
entry date, has an incentive to take a late entry date 
simply by virtue of dialing up its probability of 
getting the 180 days from whatever it would do — I 
will say “rolling the dice” in litigation, versus 
feeling pretty comfortable in a settlement that they 
will actually be able to come in on some date certain.  
That outcome can in fact be worse from a 
consumer welfare standpoint than litigation.  That 
raises the question: “What are ultimately the 
incremental welfare effects of getting rid of cash 
payments but still having a variety of other 
instruments to reach a settlement potentially with 
adverse effects to consumers? 
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MR. SUNSHINE:  First of all, I’m glad that I 
was provocative.  At least I accomplished one of my 
goals for today’s discussion. 
I hear Scott’s argument.  I’ve heard it 
before.  My criticism of the argument is that he is 
taking a microscope and looking just at the exit out 
of patent litigations and not looking at the bigger 
picture, which is the question: How many patent 
litigations are brought, how many investments are made 
in R&D, and are we achieving the right balance between 
innovation and years off the patent? 
It is easy to say after people have made 
investments, after people have committed to 
litigation, that you don’t like the exit strategy out 
of a particular settlement, but I submit that misses 
the bigger question of are we achieving the right 
balance. 
I think there is a whole other question.  
Our patent system is generally conceived to be too 
permissive; we patent too many things.  But what is 
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the right balance on the ability to challenge those?  
How do we incent the generics to basically do those 
challenges and to get out of those questions?  I think 
that looking just at the exit is too narrow of a 
question. 
The second thing is I agree with Scott that 
if a brand company pays hundreds of millions of 
dollars, let’s say, a day before the patent expires 
and gives them cash or bullion or whatever, that 
that’s anticompetitive.  I’m not here arguing that it 
should be per se legal. 
But I think if you take the Actavis case 
itself and you ignore the facts that the Supreme Court 
assumed — which actually were not in the complaint and 
incorrect — there was actually no cash paid in the 
Actavis case.  There was a co-promotion agreement that 
was entered simultaneously that had value to it for 
sure.  The question is how much value was in it, but 
the estimates of the value of that case are still 
being litigated.  The estimates of that value are all 
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less than $100 million for a product where, even under 
the settlement agreement, five years were shaved off 
the patent. 
It seems to me a true rule of reason 
analysis would allow those elements to be examined and 
discussed in a lot more detail. 
PROF. SOKOL:  Thank you, Steve.   
I’ll take questions. 
MR. KEYTE:  I’ll start with one.  It’s on 
the bargaining issue in mergers.  I’ll give it to 
Scott, who described it in detail. 
Doesn’t that kind of theory just open up the 
merger world back to potential conglomerate mergers 
and portfolio effects?  Essentially, it doesn’t really 
matter if the firms involved are competitors.  The 
hospitals cannot even be competitive in terms of the 
historical overlaps.  As long as they are dealing with 
the same insurance company, the company is bargaining. 
Therefore, Section 7 just turns into 
essentially condemning increases in bargaining 
 63 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
leverage irrespective of the underlying competition 
and lines of commerce.  Is that a concern? 
PROF. HEMPHILL:  I don’t think that’s a fair 
characterization, at least of the cases that have been 
brought.  I think I understand where you’re going.   
In the real-world cases that we have seen, 
the firms that we are talking about actually are 
rivals for inclusion in the counterparty’s bundle.  
You can imagine if I’ve got this network, maybe I 
don’t need this other network; if I’ve got this 
hospital, maybe I don’t need this other hospital.  We 
don’t in those cases necessarily confront your parade 
of horribles. 
But certainly it is true that one can 
construct models and come up with empirical results 
where the hospitals could be across the country and 
they are still jointly bargaining for inclusion, and 
then there may be an improvement in your bargaining 
position by virtue of affecting outside options. 
In those cases I understand the point that 
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the way in which we normally talk about competition is 
in some sense attenuated.   
There is a version of this in some of the 
Federal Communications Commission’s  broadcast double 
options where there is some evidence. I wrote a 
working paper on this topic. I think they observe 
effects both within the same municipality, within the 
same metropolitan statistical area, but also across 
them.  In that latter case, I think one is forced – 
the FCC, not Clayton Act necessarily — to confront 
exactly the point that you’re raising. 
MR. KEYTE:  I think it’s something to watch 
for, given how the law went away from attacking 
conglomerate mergers and the idea of post-merger 
bundling can be taken care of by other statutes. 
PROF. HEMPHILL:  But just to be clear, I 
think it is common ground between us that the actual 
FTC cases that have been brought — and, for that 
matter, payer mergers like Anthem/Cigna — do not raise 
the conglomerate concern that you are raising. 
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MR. KEYTE:  Only by focusing essentially on 
the insurance companies that can be very powerful 
themselves rather than the consumers that are actually 
getting the services, and that seems to be a road that 
can be applied to any number of things where there is 
not real consumer-level competition. 
PROF. SOKOL:  I want to wrap up.  This was a 
wonderful panel discussion.  We are going to continue 
over cocktails.  But that’s what you are really 
wondering about, competition in health care.  The 
competition I want to focus on now is red versus 
white, Argentine versus French versus German versus 
Spanish in terms of wines. 
James, do you want to have some final 
comments? 
MR. KEYTE:  No, I don’t.   
It has just been a wonderful day.  It was a 
very full day, and thank you everybody.  I think it 
was great attendance, and everybody paid great 
attention to these wonderful panels, and this was a 
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fantastic panel to end the day on. 
Move on over to cocktails, please, and then 
I hope to see you all tomorrow.  We have two other 
great keynotes and two other great panels tomorrow 
morning.  I’ll see you at cocktails. 
[Adjourned:  4:37 p.m.] 
